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In the Suprem.e Court of the 
State of Utah 
JOSEPH M. TRACY, State Engineer, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
L.M.PETERSON;MrnS.R.M. 
OLDROYD; and MILBURN IRRIGA-
TION COMPANY, a corporation, 
'Defendants and Respondents 
CASE 
NO. 7966 
RESPONDENTS' BRIE:F 
Appellant's "Statement of Facts'' is fragmentary and 
it evidences an apparent misunderstanding concerning the 
basic facts shown by the record. It is, therefore, deemed 
necessary for the respondents to make a more complete 
statement. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
·This action was commenced by Joseph M. Tracy, State 
Engineer, against the various defendants, the material alle-
gations of the complaint being as follows: 
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1. Stating the appointment and qualifications of Jo-
seph M. Tracy as· State Engineer. 
2. Stating the organization and existence of the Mil-
burn Irrigation Company, and the residence of the defend-
ants. 
3. That pursuant to statute, the plaintiff appointed 
a water commissioner of Sanpitch River. 
4. That each of the defendants is the owner of rights 
to the use of, entitled to use, and does use, waters of the 
Sanpitch River. 
5. That the salary of the said water commissioner 
was determined and fixed at a meeting duly and regularly 
called by the State Engineer of the water users of said river. 
6. That the State Engineer levied assessments during 
the years 1950 and 1951 against the water users of San-
pitch River fur their proportionate share of the moneys 
necessary to pay the expenses of said water commissioner. 
That as to the defendants, RayS. Tanner, Tim Fowels, Win-
ston Mower, George Olsen, Urban Hartley, John W. Irons, 
R. A. Olsen and Wanless Rassmusen, said assessments were 
based upon the amount of diversions. made by e ach defend-
ant during the previous year. That as to the defendant, 
Olsen and Ephraim Company, a water association, said as-
sessment was based on a flat $10 per year. That all of the 
other defendants were newly listed water users during the 
year 1951. Assessments against said water users were de-
termined by an estimate made by the water users associa· 
tion as to the amount of water used by said defendants. 
(To avoid confusion, it should be noted here that there was 
no evidence as to any water users association estimate and 
the estimates of any association are not involved.) 
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7. That defendants, and each of .them, have failed, 
neglected and refused to pay the water assessment levied 
against him by the State Engineer in the year and in the 
amount set out as follows: (Thirty-four defendants are 
then listed and the amounts assessed against each for the 
years 1951 and 1950 are stated. Only five users are listed 
for 1950, but all defendants are listed for 1951. Of the five 
for 1950, three are the respondents herein (File 1-3). 
8. That if the assessments are not paid, the State En-
gineer will not have, and at the present time does not have, 
sufficient moneys to pay the salary of the river commis-
sioner. 
The defendants and respondents, L. L. Peterson, Mrs. 
R. M. Oldroyd and Milburn Irrigation Company, filed sep-
arate answers, which were substantially as follows: 
1. The plaintiff's ·complaint as to the defendant fails 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
2. Defendant admits paragraphs 1, 2 and 7 of the com-
plaint; as to paragraphs 3 and 5 thereof, defendant alleges 
that he is without knowledge or information sufficient to 
form a ·belief as to the truth of the allegations therein con-
tained. 
3. As to paragraph 6 of the complaint, defendant ad-
mits that he received notice of purported assessments for 
the years 1950 and 1951 for the distribution of . water to 
him from Sanpitch River, but in this connection denies that 
during said years, or either of them, he had distributed to 
him or used any water from Sanpitch River, and defendant 
further denies that the State Engineer by reason of any 
estimate of the water users association, or upon any other 
pretended basis, was authorized to make any assessment 
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against the defendant, and that any such pretended assess-
ments are void. 
4. This defendant further alleges that the said pre-
tended assessments have no reasonable basis or justifica-
tion either by reason of services rendered or on account of 
any water distributed to him from Sanpitch River, for the 
payment of any proportionate share of aey monies neces-
sary to pay the water commissioners or commissioners for 
Sanpitch River. 
5. The defendant denies each and every allegation of 
the complaint not hereinbefore admitted or otherwise de-
nied (File 36-41). 
. qpon the foregoing issues the case was tried, argued 
and decided in open court in fia vor of plaintiff and against 
the defendants. The court directed the attorney for plaintiff 
to draw findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree (Tr. 
115). Following the annormcement of the court's decision 
as above stated, the attorney for plaintiff applied to the 
court to be permitted to amend the complaint by interline-
ation by adding "system" after "Sanpitch River" whenever 
the latter appeared in the complaint. Thus, paragraph 3 
of the complaint was made to read that pursuant to statute 
plaintiff appointed a water commissioner for "Sanpitch 
River System''; also in paragraph 4, 5 and 6 a similar change 
was made by adding "system" whenever "Sanpitch River" 
was mentioned in the original complaint, thereby changing 
the issues framed by the pleadings and thus making the 
evidence adduced upon the trial almost wholly inapplicable 
to the new issue attempted to be made. However, the court 
over the objection of defendants to the effect that the pro-
posed amendment would change the cause of action upon 
which the case was tried, overruled the objection and per-
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mitted the amendments to be made on the ground that they 
would conform to the evidence (Tr. 115-116). 
Appellant in his brief disposes of more than 100 pages 
of evidence reported in the transcript in five short para-
graphs. Since this is an action at law, the findings of the 
lower court must stand unless the evidence favorable to 
defendants taken as true with all reasonable intendments 
does not support the judgment. Respondent has not pointed 
out wherein the court has thus failed, but so that it may 
not be assumed from general statements that it has, we 
take this means of giving a fuller statement of the facts of 
the record which, we think, by a great preponderance sup-
port the conclusions and judgment. 
Frank Reese, ~chief accountant of the State Engineer's 
office, testified that he computed the assessments claimed 
against the defendants from a report furnished by the 
water users of the Sanpitch River, taking the overall gross 
total of acre feet delivered to the water users, arriving at 
a calculating factor ·and computing what the individual as-
sessments would be for the three defendants (Tr. 1-3); 
against Mr. Peterson, 1951-$57.55; 1950-$71.62; total-
$123.17; Mrs. Oldroyd, 1951-$26.90; 1950-$37.13; total-· 
$64.03; Milburn Irrigation Co., 1951-$66.18; 1950- $77.15; 
total- $143.33 (Tr. 4-5). HJe knew nothing about how 
much water was delivered, assumed that the reports of 
quantities made to him were correct and assumed that the 
waters were part of the waters of Sanpitch River (Tr. 6). 
In connection with his testimony it was stipulated that the 
waters of Lone Pine Creek, Dry Creek and all of the other 
creeks that come down out of the mountains in Sanpete 
County were not taken into consideration in determining 
the assessments (Tr. 7-8). 
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Blain Draper, witness for the plaintiff, testified that 
he was employed by the State Engineer as commissioner of 
the Sanpitch River and that he prepared the river commis-
sioner's report. The defendants, Peterson, Oldroyd and Mil-
burn Irrigation Company, had no measuring devices and the 
water diverted by them was estimated. He went ·up and 
viewed the diversions from time to time as he thought he 
needed to and estimated them (Tr. 11-13). He couldn't 
remember when he went up hut started about the first of 
May, and included high water as ·well as low water and 
charged them for it (Tr. 14-15), and was not interested in 
whether they put the water on their land or not {Tr. 16). 
He claimed that the Sanpitch River commences with the 
North Fork and that this was the head of Sanpitch River; 
he said that the South Fork was also the head, too (Tr. 17-
19). 
The decree in the case of Richlands Irrigation Co. v. 
West View Irrigation Company, et al, Qvil Case No. 843 
of the Fifth Judicial District, ~being the so-called ''COx De-
cree" of the general adjudication of the waters of the Sevier 
River System, was received in evidence, with particular ref-
erence to the part beginning on page 70, dealing with San· 
pitch River (Tr. 29). Chapter V of this decree, beginning 
on page 70, divided the Sanpitch River System into two 
types of awards, i. e: Sanpitch River and tributaries. For 
example, typical headings of the awards, with the pages on 
which they appear, and omitting the details as to the 
awards, are: 
"Chapter V. 
"To this includes all of the rights to the use of the wa-
ters of Sanpitch River and its tributaries and certain 
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other miscellaneous rights to the use of water in San-
pete County, Utah. 
"That as to the rights to the use of waters of Sanpitch 
River and its tributaries, and as to the right to the use 
of the water of certain miscellaneous sources of supply 
in Sanpete County, Utah, 
'' IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJU!DGED AND DE-
CREED: 
uThat the parties to this action as hereinafter set out 
in this chapter are the OWners of the right to the use 
of the waters of the Sanpitch River and its tributaries 
and from the other miscellaneous sources of supply in 
Sanpete County, within the Sevier River System, and 
they are entitled to have said waters as hereinafter set 
out, distributed to them for the purposes and in the 
quantities and for the periods of time as follows: 
Sanpitch River and Tributaries 
North Fork (p. 70) 
South Fork (p. 71) 
Lone Pine Creek (p. 72) 
Springs (p. 72) 
Stewart Spring (p. 73) 
Sanpitch River {p. 73) 
Crooked Creek & Stewart Springs (p. 73) 
Dry Creek (p. 74) 
San pitch River {p. 75) . 
Indi-an Spring Hollow (p. 75) 
Sanpitch River {PI 76) 
Oak Creek {p 76) 
Spring Branch (p. 77) 
Spring Area (p. 77) 
6 Springs {p. 78) 
Spring Area (p. ·78) 
Cottonwod Creek (p. 78) 
Seepage Springs (p. 79) 
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Oid Mill Race (p. 80) 
Spring Creek (p. 80) 
Cottonwood Wash (p. 80) 
Sanpitch River (p. 81) 
Spring Creek Sloughs (p. 81) 
Lower Spring Creek (p. 83) 
Spring Creek Canyon (p. 83) 
Archie's Hallow (p. 84) 
Birch Creek (p. 84) 
Spring Area (p. 86) 
Sanpitch River (p. 88) 
North Creek (p. 88) 
Springs (p. 91) 
Pleasant Creek (p. 92) 
Springs (p. 95) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . 
Sanpitch River and Tributaries (p. 104-111) 
Peterson Slough (p. 114) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 
Sanpitch River (p. 118) 
Gamit Canyon (p. 119) 
Sanpitch River (p. 129) 
Cottonwood and New Canyons-Tributary 
to Sanpitch River (p. 140) 
Ephraim Willow ,Creek (p. 141) 
Manti City Creek (p. 147), 
(and so forth, on down the river). 
It will thus be seen that the rights on the North and 
South Forks, under which defendants' water rights in ques-
tion come, are classified in the same manner as all other 
tributaries or other sources as distinguished from "Sanpitch 
River", and when rights are awarded under Sanpitch River 
they are done so under that term, as distinguished from 
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tributaries and other sources such as South Fork, North 
Fork, Manti City Creek, etc. 
Attention is called to the stipulation referred to above 
in this connection, wherein it is stipulated that no other 
creeks. all of \Vhich are tributary to Sanpitch River, were 
included in the water users' meeting, or assessments We 
also invite attention to page 184 of the Cox Decree reading 
as follows, \vhich again shows the difference between the 
treatment of tributaries or other sources as distinguished 
from Sanpitch River proper: 
"In the interpretation of the provisions of this decree 
under Chapter Five, the following rules must prevail 
unless it is specifically provided herein to the contrary: 
"1. That priorities, as to the use of waters, shall apply 
to each particular tributary with respect to which the 
priority of use is given, and the same shall not be ap-
plied to the priorities upon Sanpitch River unless a dif-
ferent meaning is apparent from the specific language 
of any award." 
The Cox Decree, plaintiff's Exhibit 2, was admitted in 
evidence, (Tr. 23-24), especially referring to page 70, chap-
ter V, of said decree. 
Referring to the. North Fork, a tributary of Sanpitch 
River, as shown on pages 71 to 72, the following awards· are 
made: to the water users on the North Fork of Sanpitch 
River, water rights are awarded to the amount of 15.80 cu-
bic feet per second (pp. 70-71) and on the South Thrk there 
is awarded water rights to the water users on the said trib-
utary 10.45 cubic feet per second (pp. 72-108). 
That according to the commissioner's report for 1950, 
the water users of the said North Fork at no time diverted 
or used as much water as decreed to them, except one esti-
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mated amount, as shown by said decree according to the 
report of the water commissioner for the year 1950, defend-
ant's Exhibit "E", and. the water users of the South Fork 
even according to the estimates of said water commissioner 
at no time diverted from said South Fork any water in ex-
cess of the amount decreed, e~ept at three estimates made 
by said commissioner between the 21st and 26th of May, 
incl., 1950. 
That notwithstanding these facts according to the said 
commissioner's report, plaintiff's Exhibit "E", he made over 
fifty trips up to these two forks and the diversions on them 
during the summer of 1950, a distance from Fairview of 8 
to 10 miles. No report of the water commissioner was in-
troduced in evidence in support of the 1951 assessments. 
L. L. Peterson for the defendants testified that the San-
pitch River commences just south of the divide between 
Thistle Valley and Sanpete Valley. There is a channel there 
with a spring in it, which carries in the neighborhood of 
one-half second foot of water which runs all the year round. 
There is a well-defined channel for about one-fifth of a mile 
north from where North Sanpitch Creek comes directly 
from the east and flows west until it connects with this 
stream and then both of them run south. The river runs 
north and south and North Sanpitch Creek runs into it from 
the east. There was an old dam that has broken out and 
water has run through it for years (Tr. 27-29). South San-
pitch Creek (South Fork) is about two miles south from 
North Sanpitch Creek. The Oldroyd home is two or three 
hundred feet north from where this creek crosses the road 
Then going farther south two or three miles is Lone Pine 
(Tr 30) . Sanpitch River is in the lowest part of the valley 
(Tr. 31). North Sanpitch Creek goes down fast, and from 
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the first part of June the \vater is approxintately gone, about 
dry, and that is about right as concerns South Creek (Tr. 
33). The witness had never heard until coming into court 
that the North Fork \vas considered as the Sanpitch River. 
Prior to Mr. Draper coming up the last two or three years, 
no one has come up to measure the water to his knowledge 
(Tr. 33-44). In the summer all the water of North Fork 
is used, and if water comes in below, it is run-off or seep-
age (Tr. 39). 
Melroy Graham, a witness for the defendants, testified 
that he lives at Milburn. The Peterson ranch joins the Old-
royd ranch on the north. He has charge of the Oldroyd 
ranch (Tr. 48). He gets part of his water from the North 
Sanpitch Creek and part of it from South Sanpitch Creek 
and has stock in Milburn Irrigation Company, getting water 
out of South Sanpitch Creek. The North Fork has a flush 
of early water in the spring and then it gradually gets less 
and less along in July and August, it is practically dried up, 
and the South Fork goes down to a small stream in the 
summer (Tr. 49-50). He has seen Mr. Draper six times in 
that vicinity in the last two years (Tr. 51). He takes the 
Oldroyd water out of the North Sanpitch Creek and also 
out of the South Sanpitch Creek. From the North to the 
South Sanpitch Creek it 1.8 miles. Lone Pine Creek is 1.4 
miles from South Sanpitch. Crooked Creek is one mile 
south of Lone Pine Creek. Dry Creek is 1.6 miles from 
Crooked Creek. Oak Creek is 1.9 miles from Dry Creek, 
and there are other creeks going on down south (Tr. 53). 
Oak Creek is the largest and the next largest is South San-
pitch Creek. North Sanpitch Creek flows about one second 
foot in July and August in an ordinary year and it goes 
down until some yeaTs it won't reach us. The stream west 
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of our place on the west side of the valley is called Sanpitch 
River and we do not take any water ~ut of it (Tr. 54). 
Before 1949, I don't remember anyone coming up here for 
the purpose of measuring water. North and South Sanpitch 
Creeks head up in the mountains from a seep or very small 
spring, gradually getting larger as it comes west (Tr. 55). 
No one else takes water out of North Sanpitch Creek ex-
cept us, Tanner and Mr. Peterson (Tr. 56). He had never 
heard of the North Fork called the Sanpitch River until the 
last two years, nor the South Fork (Tr. 59). South San-
pitch Creek is dry every year, as is North Sanpirtch Creek 
(Tr. 63). 
Henry V. Wheeler, who had property in Milburn in the 
vicinity of Oldroyd · and Peterson, and who had been ac-
. quainted there all of his life, testified that he was president 
of Milburn Irr~gation Company, getting water out of South 
Sanpitch Creek (Tr. 69) . 
Exhibirt "C" was admitted, being a deed by which the 
company received its water right in 1915 from the "waters 
of South Sanpitch Creek, flowing from what is known as 
South Fork of Sanpitch" (Tr. 71-72). The witness' prop-
erty was irrigated from the South Sanpitch Creek (Tr. 72). 
He had never known that the North Fork was considered 
the Sanpitch River (Tr. 74-75). His company does not take 
any water directly out of Sanpitch River. He had never 
seen the water commissioner around measuring water for 
his company, although he had seen him up by Milburn (Tr. 
75) . Sanpitch River is west, in the trough of the valley, 
running south, and he had not known of any other place 
or stream known as Sanpitch River except that. There is 
no diversion for primary right below the Milburn liTigation 
Coinpany; when the stream goes down to where is can be 
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placed in the company canal, the company handles all the 
water (Tr. 76). There are diversions below for high water 
rights, but the company has never had any trouble about 
high warter rights (Tr. 77). 
Defendants' Exhibit ''A" was received to illustrate the 
testimony (Tr. 82). This map shows them as "North San-
pitch Canyon" and "South Sanpitch Canyon". The witness 
had not seen any map listing them as the North Fork of 
the Sanpitch River and the South Fork of the Sanpitch 
River, but had a map that shows the same position of the 
creeks and li-sts them as the North Sanpitch Creek and the 
South Sanpitch Creek (Tr. 83-84). 
Charles E. Jennings, having property under the Mil-
burn Irrigation Company, testified that he was water mas-
ter for the Milburn Irrigation C'Ompany. He had never 
seen Mr. Draper around there (Tr. 87-88). Draper, he was 
informed, came to his house once and asked for him (Tr~ 
99). He disputed the amounts of water reported by Mr. 
Draper on the basis of the witness' own observation. De-
fendants' Exhibit "E" was received, showing that Draper's 
figures were based upon estimates and not measurements 
(Tr. 105). 
In rebuttal, the plaintiff recalled Frank Reese, wh~ 
testified that he attended the meetings of warter users on 
Sanpitch River during 1950, 1951 and 1952. He said rthat 
one of the gentlemen who was present, represented him-
self as chairman or a representative to the water users and 
made the startement that more than fifty-one percent of the 
water users were present. A committee called on the State 
Engineer to have Blain Draper appointed Commissioner in 
1950 and he refused, and they then considered Mr Cole, who 
acted and in 1951 and 1952, the State Engineer appointed 
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Mr. Draper as river commissioner for Sanpitch River {Tr. 
107-108). The minutes of the 1950 meeting were received 
as Exhibit No. 3 (Tr. 109). 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 was admitted and shows that a 
budget committee met with State Engineer and submitted a 
budget; some of the items were questionable under a for-
mer ruling of the Supreme Court. See Utah Power & Light 
Co. v. Richmond Irrigation Co., 115 Utah 352, 204 P.2d 818, 
esp. 825-26). 
On cross-examination Mr. Reese testified that there 
were ten or fifteen users present at the meeting, and the 
only evidence that the witness had was their representa-
tion that they stated they representeQ fifty-one percent of 
the "Sanpitch River Distribution System" (Tr. 109). He 
did not know that they represented fifty-one percent of the 
water users of the Sanpitch River, including the tributaries. 
''. . . .as a matter of fact, there was a question in my 
mind as to whether the assessments then were wrong, be-
cause of the connection of the Sevier River system. It was 
very confusing to me at that time." 
. Minutes of the 1950 meeting were admitted as Exhibit 
4. It was stipulated that copies of these minutes could be 
placed in the records (Tr. 111). 
When the evidence was closed, plaintiff moved to make 
the amendment referring to the Sanpitch River System 
rather than the Sanpitch River in his complaint, as stated 
above, which amendment was made by interlineation, but 
there was no further evidence offered, and the record is 
silent as to any notice given to users on the system as a 
whole, or any meetings or proceedings involving users on 
any part of the system except Sanpitch River and the South 
and North F1orks or Creeks. 
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The attorney for plaintiff prepared findings, conclusions 
and judgment, which were signed by the court on June 16th, 
1952, and entered June 18th, 1952 (File 48-52). Within the 
time provided by law, motion for a new tri·al was filed by 
defendants and notice duly given (File 42, 46). The mo-
tion \Vas set down for hearing for September 30th, 1952, 
and notice duly given to the attorneys for the respective 
parties. At the hearing on the motion for new trial, which 
plaintiff's counsel did not attend, the court, pursuant to 
Utah Rules of Civil Precedure 59 (a), determined that the 
findings, conclusions and judgment were erroneous and or-
dered the attorneys for the defendant to prepare new find-
ings, conclusions and judgment, and in accordance with the 
direction of the court, this was done, and copies were served 
upon the attorney for plaintiff, together with a cost bill, on 
or about the 13th day of October, 1952 (File 53-63). 
On October 14th, 1952, the court signed the proposed 
findings, conclusions and judgment, and on the 21st of Oc-
tober, 1952, copies of the findings, conclusions and judgment 
as signed and entered were served upon the attorney for 
the plaintiff (File 68) . On the 21st day of Ocrtober, 1952, 
the attorneys for plaintiff filed and served upon the attor-
neys for the defendants the following objections: 
"Comes now the plaintiff above named and objects to 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, submit-
ted by the defendants herein, and particularly to Find-
ings No. 4, No. 5, No. 6, No. 8, No. 10, No. 11, No. 13 
and No. 14, on the grounds that they are contrary to 
the evidence, and in violation of the statutes. 
"[)ated this 20th day of October, 1952". 
(Filed October 21st, 1952) . 
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At the same time notice was given that the "plaintiff 
will call up its objections to the proposed findings of fact, 
and conclusions of law, on Monday, November 17th, 1952, 
at 10 a. m., or as soon thereafter as plaintiff can be heard." 
Later, the hearing on said objections was continued until 
December 1st, 1952, at which time, after hearing argu-
ments, the objections were by the court overruled and the 
last findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment were 
ordered to remain as the decision of the court. 
'On the 31st day of December, 1952, the attorney for 
the plaintiff filed in the office of the clerk of the District 
Court purported notice of appeal in the following form: 
(Title of Court and Oause) 
''Comes now the plaintiff and appeals from the decision 
of the judge of the above entitled court entered on the 
1st day of December, 1952, and from the findings of 
fact, ·conclusions of law and decree entered in the above 
entitled matter 
''Dated this 30th day of December, 1952. 
js/ J. Lambert Gibson 
Attorney for Plaintiff" 
(File 69). Filed December 31st, 1952. 
No designation of the record on appeal or statement 
of points was filed until after the file had been forwarded 
to the Supreme Court and until after the defendants moved 
to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that it was not taken 
in time. This was several months after the time provided 
by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The appeal should be dismissed. 
Motion has been duly made. While upon oral presen-
tation, this motion was denied, it is our understanding that 
this does not preclude us from presenting the matter for 
final adjudication in this brief. The matter is jurisdictional 
and a review of the record in the light of prior decisions of 
this Court will indicate, we believe, that if the appeal here 
can be sustained, the Rules of Civil Procedure concerning 
the mannar and time of taking appeals jurisdictional by 
the express provisions of those rules and prior statute, will 
hvae been disregarded. They should not be ·disregarded in 
one case if they are to be applied in others. 
URCP 73 (a) provides in the most positive language 
that the time within which an appeal may be taken shall 
be one month from the entry of the judgment appealed from 
unless a shorter time is provided by law, except upon a 
showing of excusable neglect based on a failure of a party 
to learn of the entry of the judgment, the District Court in 
any action may extend the time for appeal not exceeding 
one month from the expiration of the original time herein 
prescribed. The judgment in this case was entered on Oc-
tober 14th~ 1952. The purported notice of appeal was filed 
December 30th, 1952. There was no showing of excusable 
neglect before the District Court based on a failure of a 
party to learn of the entry of the judgment, or for any other 
reason. As a matter of fact, the record shows that not only 
were the proposed findings, conclusions and judgment 
served upon plaintiff's attorney, but within one week from 
their signing by the judge, additional copies showing the 
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signature on the final papers were served. No application 
was made at any time to the District Court. 
The same rule provides that the running of the time 
for appeal is terminated by a timely motion made pursuant 
to any of the following rules hereinafter enwnerated, and 
the full time for appeal fixed in this subdivision commences 
to run and is to be computed from the entry of any of the 
following orders made upon a timely motion under such 
rules: Granting or denying a motion for judgment under 
Rule 50(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact, 
whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be re-
quired if the motion is granted; or granting or denying a 
motion under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or 
denying a motion for a new trial under Rule 59. No such 
motion was ever filed, claimed or acted upon. The only 
paper filed was the objection to findings and conclusions 
which moved the court to do nothing, was directed only to 
proposed findings and conclusions and which were in no 
way changed in form or substance after plaintiff was served 
with eopies of the signed findings, eonclusions and judg-
ment. After he was so served, there remained twenty-three 
days for an appeal to be rtaken. There even remained three 
days for the filing of a motion for a new trial or the other 
motions specified in the rule. Nothing further was filed. 
This Court recently dismissed an appeal because it was not 
filed strictly within the one month. Brennan v. Lynch, 254 
P.2d 454, Utah . In that case, the appellant 
was only one day late. In the ·case at bar, he was more than 
a month late. . This Court has properly pointed out that 
notice of the judgment or ruling is not required to set the 
time running. In re: Bundy's Estate, 241 P.2d 462. In 
the case at bar, notice was actually given. 
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To say that the objection to proposed findings is a mo-
tion for new trial or similar motion, in spite of subsequent 
actual notice of the entry of judgment, and the ·fact that by 
no stretch of the imagination could such objection be 
thought to ·be one of the motions so specifically designated 
in the rule, seems to say that a mere intent will substitute 
for one of such motions or timely notice of appeal. It is to 
say more, for there is nothing in the objection which re-
sembles a motion or which indicates an intent to file any 
such motion or to do anything else but note objections to 
proposed findings and conclusions, which intent was made 
completely moot and ineffective to the knowledge of plain-
tiff by receipt of copy of the findings, ·conclusions and judg-
ment as signed by the trial court. 
A reference to Rule 7, URCP, will show that by very 
definition the objection could not be considered a motion: 
"-An application to the court for an order shall be by 
motion which, unless made during a hearing or trial, 
shall be made in writing, shall state with particularity 
the grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief or 
order sought. The requirement of writing is fulfilled 
if the motion is stated in a written notice of the hearing 
of the motion.'' 
This matter is jurisdictional, and jurisdiction must ap-
pear as we understand it. It should not be sufficient to say 
that a motion might have been intended or would have ·been 
filed under other circumstances or might have been acted 
upon without any filing or even any making or presenta-
tion to the court, which the record utterly fails to disclose. 
The form of the notice of ·appeal itself, which is also 
jurisdictional, should be fatal to the appeal. The court to 
which the appeal is taken is not stated in the notice. Rule 
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73 (b) specifically provides that "The notice of appeal shall 
. . . . designate that the appeal is taken to the Su-
preme Court.'' Plaintiff's notice of appeal does not do this 
in form, substance or at all. The filing of the notice of ap-
peal required by the rule is mandatory. If it is now to be 
said that this rule does not mean what it says by manda-
tory language concerning the contents of a notice, the filing 
of which is jurisdictional, then any paper, whether it com-
plied with the rule in any respect, could be deemed a notice 
of appeal. 
No motion was filed to extend the time; the appeal was 
not taken in time; the notice of appeal did not contain the 
substance of what is required by the mandatory language 
of the rule; the designation of the record was not filed in 
time; no statement of points was filed as provided by the 
rule. It would seem that if in any case an appeal should 
be dismissed, this would be it. We submit that it should 
be. There is nothing in the rules, or in our history or prac-
tice before, that would exempt the State from the require-
ments applicable to citizens on these points. 
n. Assignments or points sought to be raised by appel-
lant are not based on the r.ecord, involve a misinterpJ~e­
tation of it, and establish no basis for reversing the judg-
ment of the lower court. 
Assignment No. 1. This assignment is divided into 
two parts: the first portion of the assignment follows 
verbatim: 
"That the trial court erred in finding that the respond-
ents were not water users diverting water from the San-
pitch River System." 
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There is no specification as to which particular find-
ing of the court in which the court so found. We will there-
fore examine the court's findings to determine if the court 
so found. If the court so found, error will be admitted. If 
the court did not make such finding, such assignment should 
be disregarded. 
The court made fourteen findings (File 55 to 58), and 
we submit that in none of such findings did the court make 
any finding in substance or effect as set out in assignment 
of error No. 1; but on the contrary, in its finding No~ 12, 
the court did find that the respondents are Water users di-
verting water from the Sanpitch River System, which said 
finding reads as follows: · 
"12. The court further finds that the North Fork and 
the South Fork of the Sanpitch River are tributaries 
of said river, and are a part of the Sanpitch River Sys-
tem, as alleged in the Amended ~Complaint of the plain-
tiffs herein as are numerous other tributaries of the 
Sanpitch River as disclosed by the evidence in this case, 
but the evidence further shows that the water users 
from said North and South Forks are the only water 
users using water from the tributaries of Sanpitch 
River that have been assessed for the salary and expen-
ses of the water commissioner of Sanpirtch River Sys-
tem for the years 1950 and 1951," 
As to the latter part of Assignment No. 1, that said 
assessment was unauthorized and void, this necessarily fol-
lows from the finding made. 
Asignment No. 2. This assignment is in two parts; 
the first part reads verbatim as follows: 
''The trial court erred in finding that the water com-
missioner never attempted to measure or distribute any of 
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the water of the Sanpitch River, including the North and 
south Forks thereof." 
Appellant's brief does not specify where such alleged 
finding may be found, or in whi~ch of the court's findings 
such assigned error may be found. We submit, however, 
that no such finding as error No. 2, either in substance or 
effeot, can be found in the court's findings. The only find-
ing where even the language of the said assignment may in 
part be found is finding No. 10, which is here set out ver-
batim: 
u10. That the State Engineer during the years 1950 
and 1951, made assessments against the water users 
of the Sanpitch River, and included the water users 
from the North Fork and the South Fork of San pitch 
River, so called in the Cox Decree, for the alleged pro-
portionate share of the money necessary to pay the 
salary and expenses of the water commissioner of San-
pitch River, and including the water users of the two 
tributaries of Sanpitch River ealled North and South· 
Forks, but said State Engineer did not include or at-
tempt to include the water users of the other tribu-
taries of Sanpitch River, and said water commissioner 
·at different times visited, and at times claimed to esti-
mate the water being diverted from these forks by the 
defendants herein, but he never attempted to measure 
of distribute any of said waters." 
There is nothing in such finding that could even re-
motely be held to find that the commissioner did not meas-
ure any of the water of Sanpitch River. 
In the last portions of assignments of error Nos. 1 and 
2, where the court is alleged to find and ·conclude that the 
assessment made by the State Engineer was unauthorized 
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and void, it should be noted that this holding applied only 
to the- respondents herein, the great bulk of the assessments 
being on Sanpitch River proper and therefore regular. 
The only finding of the court wherein it is found that 
the assesments made by the State Engineer were fotmd to 
be unauthorized and void is finding No. 14, and that find-
ing specifically mentions the assessments against the re-
spondents, which is here set out verbatim: 
"14. The court further finds that any assessment 
levied or attempted to be levied by the plaintiff against 
the defendants herein, L. L. Peterson, Mrs. R .. M. Old-
royd and/or the Milburn Irrigation Company, for the 
years 1950 and 1951 as water users of the Sanpitch 
River System and as claimed by plaintiff's amended 
complaint was, and is, unauthorized and therefore 
void." 
m. The court did not err in its Findings of Fact; and 
its Conclusions of Law and Judgment are fully supported 
by the Findings of Fact. 
In the first point in appellant's brief, it is argued "That 
the trial court erred in finding that the respondents are 
not water users diverting from the Sanpitch River System 
. . . . " Under his point II, it is stated "That the trial 
court erred in finding that the water commissioner never 
atempted to measure or distribute any of the water of the 
Sanpitch River, including the North and South Forks there-
of . . . ." We find it impossible to present our argu-
ment under headings corresponding to such assignments 
for, as we have already pointed out in Division II of this 
brief, no such findings were made. No findings other than 
these supposed findings are attacked. 
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We do submit, however, that the court's determinative 
jactual findings are supported by the great preponderance 
of the evidence and on most phases by the tmdisputed evi-
dence. The court found in finding No. 10 that the State 
Engineer during the years 1950 and 1951 made assessments 
against the water users of the Sanpitch River, and included 
the water users from the North Fork and the South Fork 
of Sanpitch River, so called in the Cox Decree, for the al-
leged proportionate share of the money necessary to pay the 
salary and expenses of the water commissioner of Sanpitch 
River, and including the water users of the two tributaries 
of Sanpitch River ~called the North and South Forks, but 
said State Engineer did not include or attempt to include 
the water users of other tributaries of Sanpitch River, and 
said water eommissioner at different times visited, and at 
times claimed to estimate the water being diverted from 
these forks by the defendants therein, but he never attemp-
ted to measure or distribute any of said water. There is 
no dispute in the record in support of this finding. 
It seems apparent from the evidence introduced on be-
half of the plaintiff and in that connection assuming that 
the water commissioner of Sanpitch River went up to the 
various diversions on the North and South Forks and looked 
at them, then estimated the amount of water therein and 
entered these amounts in his book as testified to by him, 
without distributing or attempting to distribute any of such 
water between the water users and without any necessity 
in the least, could clearly be of no benefit to such water us-
ers, or to anyone else, except as a means, perhaps of easing 
the assessment burden upon the water users of the Sanpitch 
River below, and even if it should be further assumed that 
these tributaries were actually a part of the Sanpitch River 
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proper, even then there would be no service rendered to 
the water users on such tributaries, or even to the water 
users of the Sanpitch River, excepting as they might :be 
benefited to the extent of the tribute imposed upon the de-· 
fendants herein, which assumptions, however, are clearly 
contrary to the basic classification in the Cox Decree and 
contrary to the common acceptance over many years by 
all interested parties without at least including the other 
tributaries in the same positions. 
By his amendment at the close of the evidence heap-
parently abandoned his contention that the North and South 
Forks, or Creeks, were a part of Sanpitch River proper, and 
relied upon their being part of the Sanpitch River System. 
This the court found, but since there was no evidence either 
offered or received that the assessment had been levied for 
the Sanpitch River System at meetings called thereof, nor 
even that Mr. Draper or his predecessor was commissioner 
for the Sanpitch River System, and it affirmatively appear-
ing that no proper assessment against the users under the 
Sanpitch River System as a whole had ever been made or 
attempted, it was properly concluded that the assessments 
against the defendants were unauthorized and void. 
The cases cited by plaintiff in principle support this 
conclusion, as they recognize that arbitrary assessments 
are contrary to law. 
The first case cited by plaintiff is Bacon, State Engi-
neer v. Gunnison Fayette Canal Company, 284 Pac. 1004, 
75 Utah 278 decided January 30th 1930. The ~controversy 
in this case arose from the method employed by the State 
Engineer in apportioning the costs of distribution among 
the water users of the Sevier River System (not including 
San pitch River) . Previous to the year in question, such 
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costs had been assessed against the users of water pro-rata, 
according to the quantity of water distributed to the users 
respectively, and as the assessments were to be paid in ad-
vance, the State Engineer's schedule of distribution for one 
year was the basis of the apportionment for the next. 
Such method had caused objections,. so in 1926 the 
State Engineer introduced a new basis for apportionment 
whereby the amount to be assessed and collected from the 
users was made according to the amount of land upon which 
the users were entitled to use the water for irrigation. The 
new method proposed was shown by the evidence to be un-
equal as to benefits received and services rendered in the 
case of the defendant, as it owned largely secondary rights, 
which were ample for a short period during the high water 
and then decreased so that later crops could not be served 
and as a consequence, only crops that could be grown by 
early irrigation eould be produced. 
This case set a pattern which has been largely followed 
in later similar cases. Theretofore by statute, it was pro-
vided that the costs of maintenance of ditches and canals 
owned jointly by different parties were required to be paid 
in accordance with the rights of such parties in the ditches 
or canals, and where the State Engineer was called upon 
by water users to distribute water to which they are entitled 
as provided by statute, such users were required to pay 
their respe·ctive portions of the costs. 
The court in deciding the case above mentioned, de-
termined that some similar method could well be satisfac-
torily employed by prescribing that the salary and expenses 
of the water commissioner should be borne pro-rata by the 
users of water from such river system. As the court con-
cluded, the method employed by the State Engineer did not 
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meet that requirement. The judgment of the lower court 
was reversed and costs were awarded against the respond-
ent, State Engineer. 
The next case cited by appellant is Bacon, State En-
gineer, v. Plain City Irrigation Co. (another river system 
case) 52 P.2d 427, 87 Utah 564, decided November 27th, 
1935. This case reaffirmed the principle of the decision of 
the Gunnison Fayette Canal Company case and on account 
of the engineer failing to comply with that standard in the 
attempted apportionment. Judgment was reversed, with 
costs against the State Engineer. 
The other case cited by the appellant in his brief is 
Utah Power and Light Co. v. Richmond Irrigation Com-
pany, et al, decided April 8th, 1949, 204 P.2d 818, 115 Utah 
352. This case also approves the formula or method laid 
down in the two previous cases, to the effect t hat a stand-
ard should be employed in apportioning the salary and ex-
penses of the State Engineer and making distribution of 
water between water users in any water system or water 
source. It is indicated that under the statute providing for 
apportionment of the costs of the water commissioners for 
distribution of water from any river system or water source, 
required that expenses shall be borne pro-rata by wate·r 
users based on their individual rights, although mathe-
matical accuracy is impossible, apportionment ought to be 
according to some standard which aproximates an appor-
tion made according to services rendered .and benefits re-
ceived. (In this case, the two cases hereinabove cited were 
analyzed and approved with respect to the formula above 
mentioned), and in the course of the opini·on, the Court said: 
"A different question arises in ~connection with the as-
sessment levied against Wellsville North Field lrriga-
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tlon Company. Sec. 100-5-1, U.C.A., 1943, hereinbe--
fore quoted, provides that the commissioner shall be 
appointed when in the judgment of the state engineer 
or the judge of tJhe district court it is necessary for the 
purpose of distributing the waters from any river, 
stream, or water source. This statute suggests two 
elements: first, that distribution of the water between 
users is necessary; and ~cond, that the persons or coin-
panies chargeable with costs and expenses of the com-
nrlssioner obtain their water from the same water sys-
tem or common water sQurce. To these two elemenis 
should be added the requirement suggested in our 
previous opinions, namely, that the assessment levied 
should bear some reasonable relationship to the servi-
ces performed or the benefits conferred. The record 
shows an absence of all of these elements in the case 
of Wellsville North Field Irrigation Company. 
"There appears to be no necessity for a ·commissioner 
to distribute the waters obtained from the springs lo-
cated on the property of the Wellsville North Field Ir-
rigation ·Company. The water used by this irrigation 
company rises from two springs and all of the flow of 
one spring and one-half the flow of the other is dis-
tributed through a system of canals exclusively under 
its maintenance and control. The flow frQill the springs 
does not equal the company's de·creed right and all of 
the water belonging to the company is used by its mem-
bers or stockholders. While some of the water reaches 
the Little Bear River after it passes from the land irri-
gated by the company, there is no reasonable possi-
bility of a commissioner performing servic.es in connec-
tion with the distribution of the escaping waters. Nei-
ther is there any reasonable nec~ty for a commis-
sioner to divide the waters of ODte spring as this is done 
by a permanent cement dividing headgate. (Emphasis 
ours.) 
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"Moreover, we are not convinced that the Wellsville 
North Field Irrigation Company should be considered 
as a user of water from the Little Bear River system 
or from a source common with the other users. We do 
not believe the Legislature intended to make the words 
'water source' so inclusive that every person using sur-
face water, percolating water, spring water or artesian 
water should all be charged with the ~costs and expen-
ses of a commissioner because some part of their flow 
could be traced to a common source. We believe that 
the words were used in their generally accepted mean-
ing and that 'source' was intended to be restricted to 
one origin such as a stream, a rise from the ground, a 
fountain, a spring, an artesian basis or some similar 
body; and that it was not the intention of the Legis-
lature to combine a river system with springs and ar-
tesian basins for purposes of distribution and adminis-
tration. We conceive many situations where such a 
combination would bring about impracticable and im-
possible results. 
''To require this company to bear a portion of the ex-
pense of maintaing a river commissioner who does not 
render service to it and who in no way assists in dis-
tributing its water to any user would not be in keep-
ing with the purposes or the statute or the previous de-
cisions of this court.'' 
Justice Wolfe, concurring, said the following: 
''I concur in the part of the opinion dealing with the 
Wellsville North Field Irrigation ~Company on the other 
ground names, to-wit: that no services are performed 
for this company hy the commissioner, and the included 
reason that there can be no relationship between ser-
vices performed for, or benefits received by, the user 
and the costs of distribution because no services are 
rendered nor benefits conferred." 
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That while these three cases are essentially river sys-
tem cases and are distinguishable from this case now be-
fore. the Court, they support the position that whatever the 
water commissioner of Sanpitch River, Blain Draper, d~d 
as testified to by him as to visiting the said two tributaries 
of Sanpitch River in 1950 and 1951, did not meet any stand-
ard as to service and benefits, that could authorize any 
assessments levied upon the respondents herein by the State 
Engineer. Such visits as respect service to such water use 
was a ridiculous pretense and brazen attempt to impose an 
unauthorized assessment upon the respondents. 
Aside from that, these tributaries are not a part of 
Sanpitch River, and have never through the years been con-
sidered as such, and the attempt to interpret the Cox De-
cree to mean that Sanpitch River proper, as distinguished 
from the tributaries, heads up in the top of the Wasatch 
Range at the head water of two canyons approximately two 
miles apart and about seven miles long, is wholly Wlreas-
onable, and the court most properly found against any such 
theory. 
Finally, it would be the very essence of inequality and 
capriciousness to say that these ·two tributaries out of a 
large number of others in the same situation could be 
singled out to help bear the cost of maintaining a water 
commissioner upon the Sanpitch River. 
IV. The court did not err in assessing costs against the 
State Engineer. 
It is urged by plaintiff under its point III that the court 
erred in assesing ~costs against the State Engineer. 
We can find no statute exempting the State Engineer 
from costs in such actions as this. Utah Code Annotated, 
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1953, 73-3-14, provides that "The State Engineer must be 
joined as a defendant in all suits to review his decision, but 
no judgment for costs or expenses of the litigation shall be 
rendered against him . . . . '' This provision can have 
no application to the present case, which is not one in which 
the State Engineer is a nominal party, but is one where he 
is seeking in his own right as State Engineer a money judg-
ment against a defendant. 
The plaintiff cites the last part of Rule 54 (d) to the 
effect that costs against the State of Utah, its officers and 
agencies, shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by 
law. Costs against the State Engineer in an appeal to the 
District Court under 73-3-13 is not permitted by law. We· 
subrriit that they are authorized in such ·cases as the one 
now before this Court. We think the first part of Rule 
54(d) applies, that "Except when express provision th~ 
for is made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, 
costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party 
tmless the court otherwise directs . . . . '' As a mat-
ter of fact, in two of. the cases cited by plaintiff in his brief 
in connection with other points, costs were awarded against 
the State Engineer. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's appeal should be dismissed for plaintiff's fail-
ure to file notice of appeal within time, and for other 
reasons specified in this brief. This is not such a case that 
would justify bending and breaking well established rules 
. I 
governing jurisdictional requirements on appeal, if indeed 
any case .. is such a one·. The points upon which appellants 
r~ly do not furnish any sound basis for claiming that the 
judgment of the trial court spould not be permitted to stand. 
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Not only is there competent evidence in the record to sup-
port the findings, conclusions and judgment, but the evi-
dence greatly preponderates in favor of the defendants' 
position. It affirmatively appears that the North and South 
Forks or Creeks from which defendants obtain their water 
are classified by the Cox Decree and by common accept-
ance for many years as tributaries, as distinguished from, 
Sanpitch River; that the River Commissioner was appointro 
and authorized to act only with respect to Sanpitch River 
prope~; that to single out two tributaries out of a large nwn· 
ber of others of the same nature to apply assessments 
against was unauthorized and arbitrary, and that the pur-
ported services of the commissioner on the North and South 
Forks were not such as to justify the assessments; that the 
commissioner was never appointed or intended to be ap.. 
pointed for the Sanpitch River System, including the tribu-
taries, and even if he were, to make assessments against 
two trihutarie~ out of perhaps fifty in like position, cannot 
be sustained. The trial court was correct in declaring such 
assessments against the defendants void. 
The importance of defendants' case, extending beyond 
the relatively small amount of money at present involved, 
has justified, we have been led to believe, the somewhat ex-
tended treatment we have. endeavored to give it in this 
brief, and we trust will merit the favorable consideration of 
the Supreme Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. H. CHRISTENSON 
A. SHERMAN CHRISTENSON 
for CHRISTENSON & CHRISTENSON, 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Respondents 
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